CJEU - Judgment C-840/24 VG Wort 22 Oct 2026

Provisional text

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Fifth Chamber)

22 October 2026 (*)

( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Copyright and related rights – Directive 2014/26/EU – Collecting society – Article 3(h) – Rights revenue, including compensation for private copying and remuneration for public lending – Article 11(4) – Use of that revenue for purposes other than distribution to rightholders – Funding of social, cultural or educational services – Article 12(4) – Deductions made by the collecting society – Article 13(4) and (6) – Amounts deemed non-distributable – National legislation providing for the promotion of works of cultural importance )

In Case C-840/24,

REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice, Germany), made by decision of 21 November 2024, received at the Court on 10 December 2024, in the proceedings

Verwertungsgesellschaft Wort (VG Wort)

TL,

THE COURT (Fifth Chamber),

composed of M.L. Arastey Sahún, President of the Chamber, B. Smulders (Rapporteur), E. Regan, J. Passer and D. Gratsias, Judges,

Advocate General: M. Szpunar,

Registrar: F. Cathagne, Administrator,

having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 26 November 2025,

after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:

– Verwertungsgesellschaft Wort (VG Wort), by T. Winter, Rechtsanwalt,

– TL, by T. von Plehwe, Rechtsanwalt,

– the German Government, by J. Möller, M. Hellmann, L. Hülsmann, and A. Sahner, acting as Agents,

– the French Government, by B. Dourthe and H. Nunes da Silva, acting as Agents,

– the Austrian Government, by A. Posch, J. Schmoll and G. Kunnert, acting as Agents,

– the European Commission, by J. Samnadda and G. von Rintelen, acting as Agents,

after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 26 February 2026,

gives the following

Judgment

1 This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (OJ 2001 L 167, p. 10), of the first sentence of Article 6(1) of Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property (OJ 2006 L 376, p. 28) and of Article 11(4) and Article 12(4) of Directive 2014/26/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online use in the internal market (OJ 2014 L 84, p. 72).

2 The request has been made in proceedings between TL, acting in a personal capacity and as assignee of OS’s rights, authors of literary works, and Verwertungsgesellschaft Wort (VG Wort) (‘VG Wort’), a copyright collecting society, concerning the financing by VG Wort of a fund for the promotion of science with revenue from copyright management.

Legal context

European Union law

Directive 2001/29

3 Article 5 of Directive 2001/29, entitled ‘Exceptions and limitations’, provides in paragraph 2 thereof:

‘Member States may provide for exceptions or limitations to the reproduction right provided for in Article 2 in the following cases:

…

(b) in respect of reproductions on any medium made by a natural person for private use and for ends that are neither directly nor indirectly commercial, on condition that the rightholders receive fair compensation which takes account of the application or non-application of technological measures referred to in Article 6 to the work or subject matter concerned;

…’

Directive 2006/115

4 Article 6 of Directive 2006/115, entitled ‘Derogation from the exclusive public lending right’, provides in paragraph 1 thereof:

‘Member States may derogate from the exclusive right provided for in Article 1 in respect of public lending, provided that at least authors obtain a remuneration for such lending. Member States shall be free to determine this remuneration taking account of their cultural promotion objectives.’

Directive 2014/26

5 Recitals 1, 3, 6 to 9, 26 and 28 of Directive 2014/26 state:

‘(1) The Union Directives which have been adopted in the area of copyright and related rights already provide a high level of protection for rightholders and thereby a framework wherein the exploitation of content protected by those rights can take place. Those Directives contribute to the development and maintenance of creativity. In an internal market where competition is not distorted, protecting innovation and intellectual creation also encourages investment in innovative services and products.

…

(3) Article 167 [TFEU] requires the [European] Union to take cultural diversity into account in its action and to contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore. Collective management organisations play, and should continue to play, an important role as promoters of the diversity of cultural expression, both by enabling the smallest and less popular repertoires to access the market and by providing social, cultural and educational services for the benefit of their rightholders and the public.

…

(6) The need to improve the functioning of collective management organisations has already been identified in Commission Recommendation [2005/737/EC of 18 May 2005 on collective cross-border management of copyright and related rights for legitimate online music services (OJ 2005 L 276, p. 54, corrigendum OJ 2005 L 284, p. 10)]. That Recommendation set out a number of principles, such as the freedom of rightholders to choose their collective management organisations, equal treatment of categories of rightholders and equitable distribution of royalties. … However, the Recommendation has been unevenly followed.

(7) The protection of the interests of the members of collective management organisations, rightholders and third parties requires that the laws of the Member States relating to copyright management and multi-territorial licensing of online rights in musical works should be coordinated with a view to having equivalent safeguards throughout the Union …

(8) The aim of this Directive is to provide for coordination of national rules concerning access to the activity of managing copyright and related rights by collective management organisations, the modalities for their governance, and their supervisory framework …

(9) The aim of this Directive is to lay down requirements applicable to collective management organisations, in order to ensure a high standard of governance, financial management, transparency and reporting. This should not, however, prevent Member States from maintaining or imposing, in relation to collective management organisations established in their territories, more stringent standards than those laid down in Title II of this Directive, provided that such more stringent standards are compatible with Union law.

…

(26) Collective management organisations collect, manage and distribute revenue from the exploitation of the rights entrusted to them by rightholders. That revenue is ultimately due to rightholders, who may have a direct legal relationship with the organisation, or may be represented via an entity which is a member of the collective management organisation or via a representation agreement. It is therefore important that a collective management organisation exercise the utmost diligence in collecting, managing and distributing that revenue. Accurate distribution is only possible where the collective management organisation maintains proper records of membership, licences and use of works and other subject matter. Relevant data that are required for the efficient collective management of rights should also be provided by rightholders and users and verified by the collective management organisation.

…

(28) Since rightholders are entitled to be remunerated for the exploitation of their rights, it is important that management fees do not exceed justified costs of the management of the rights and that any deduction other than in respect of management fees, for example a deduction for social, cultural or educational purposes, should be decided by the members of the collective management organisation. The collective management organisations should be transparent towards rightholders regarding the rules governing such deductions. The same requirements should apply to any decision to use the rights revenue for collective distribution, such as scholarships. Rightholders should have access, on a non-discriminatory basis, to any social, cultural or educational service funded through such deductions. This Directive should not affect deductions under national law, such as deductions for the provision of social services by collective management organisations to rightholders, as regards any aspects that are not regulated by this Directive, provided that such deductions are in compliance with Union law.’

6 Article 1 of that directive, entitled ‘Subject matter’, provides:

‘This Directive lays down requirements necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the management of copyright and related rights by collective management organisations. It also lays down requirements for multi-territorial licensing by collective management organisations of authors’ rights in musical works for online use.’

7 Article 3 of Directive 2014/26, entitled ‘Definitions’, provides:

‘For the purposes of this Directive, the following definitions shall apply:

…

(c) “rightholder” means any person or entity, other than a collective management organisation, that holds a copyright or related right or, under an agreement for the exploitation of rights or by law, is entitled to a share of the rights revenue;

(d) “member” means a rightholder or an entity representing rightholders, including other collective management organisations and associations of rightholders, fulfilling the membership requirements of the collective management organisation and admitted by it;

…

(h) “rights revenue” means income collected by a collective management organisation on behalf of rightholders, whether deriving from an exclusive right, a right to remuneration or a right to compensation;

…’

8 Article 5 of that directive, entitled ‘Rights of rightholders’, provides in paragraph 2 thereof:

‘Rightholders shall have the right to authorise a collective management organisation of their choice to manage the rights, categories of rights or types of works and other subject matter of their choice, for the territories of their choice, irrespective of the Member State of nationality, residence or establishment of either the collective management organisation or the rightholder. Unless the collective management organisation has objectively justified reasons to refuse management, it shall be obliged to manage such rights, categories of rights or types of works and other subject matter, provided that their management falls within the scope of its activity.’

9 Article 8 of Directive 2014/26, entitled ‘General assembly of members of the collective management organisation’, provides, in paragraph 5 thereof:

‘In accordance with the provisions laid down in Chapter 2 of Title II, the general assembly of members shall decide at least on the following issues:

(a) the general policy on the distribution of amounts due to rightholders;

(b) the general policy on the use of non-distributable amounts;

(c) the general investment policy with regard to rights revenue and to any income arising from the investment of rights revenue;

(d) the general policy on deductions from rights revenue and from any income arising from the investment of rights revenue;

(e) the use of non-distributable amounts;

…’

10 Chapter 2 of Directive 2014/26, entitled ‘Management of rights revenue’, which comes under Title II of that directive, itself entitled ‘Collective management organisations’, contains Articles 11 to 13.

11 Article 11 of that directive, entitled ‘Collection and use of rights revenue’, provides, in paragraph 4 thereof:

‘A collective management organisation shall not be permitted to use rights revenue or any income arising from the investment of rights revenue for purposes other than distribution to rightholders, except where it is allowed to deduct or offset its management fees in compliance with a decision taken in accordance with point (d) of Article 8(5) or to use the rights revenue or any income arising from the investment of rights revenue in compliance with a decision taken in accordance with Article 8(5).’

12 Under Article 12 of Directive 2014/26, entitled ‘Deductions’:

‘1. Member States shall ensure that where a rightholder authorises a collective management organisation to manage his rights, the collective management organisation is required to provide the rightholder with information on management fees and other deductions from the rights revenue and from any income arising from the investment of rights revenue, before obtaining his consent to its managing his rights.

2. Deductions shall be reasonable in relation to the services provided by the collective management organisation to rightholders, including, where appropriate, the services referred to in paragraph 4, and shall be established on the basis of objective criteria.

3. Management fees shall not exceed the justified and documented costs incurred by the collective management organisation in managing copyright and related rights.

Member States shall ensure that the requirements applicable to the use and the transparency of the use of amounts deducted or offset in respect of management fees apply to any other deductions made in order to cover the costs of managing copyright and related rights.

4. Where a collective management organisation provides social, cultural or educational services funded through deductions from rights revenue or from any income arising from the investment of rights revenue, such services shall be provided on the basis of fair criteria, in particular as regards access to, and the extent of, those services.’

13 Article 13 of Directive 2014/26, entitled ‘Distribution of amounts due to rightholders’, provides, in paragraphs 1, 3, 4 and 6 thereof:

‘1. Without prejudice to Article 15(3) and Article 28, Member States shall ensure that each collective management organisation regularly, diligently and accurately distributes and pays amounts due to rightholders in accordance with the general policy on distribution referred to in point (a) of Article 8(5).

Member States shall also ensure that collective management organisations or their members who are entities representing rightholders distribute and pay those amounts to rightholders as soon as possible but no later than nine months from the end of the financial year in which the rights revenue was collected, unless objective reasons relating in particular to reporting by users, identification of rights, rightholders or matching of information on works and other subject matter with rightholders prevent the collective management organisation or, where applicable, its members from meeting that deadline.

…

3. The collective management organisation shall take all necessary measures, consistent with paragraph 1, to identify and locate the rightholders. …

4. Where the amounts due to rightholders cannot be distributed after three years from the end of the financial year in which the collection of the rights revenue occurred, and provided that the collective management organisation has taken all necessary measures to identify and locate the rightholders referred to in paragraph 3, those amounts shall be deemed non-distributable.

…

6. Member States may limit or determine the permitted uses of non-distributable amounts, inter alia, by ensuring that such amounts are used in a separate and independent way in order to fund social, cultural and educational activities for the benefit of rightholders.’

German law

14 Under Paragraph 27(1) of the Gesetz über die Wahrnehmung von Urheberrechten und verwandten Schutzrechten durch Verwertungsgesellschaften (Law on the management of copyright and related rights by collecting societies) of 24 May 2016 (BGBl. 2016 I, p. 1190), in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings (‘the VGG’), the collecting society is to establish fixed rules which exclude any arbitrariness in the allocation of rights revenue (distribution plan).

15 Paragraph 32(1) of the VGG provides:

‘The collecting society shall be called upon to promote works and services of cultural importance.’

The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling

16 VG Wort is a collecting society responsible for exploiting the copyright of authors of texts and their publishers, conferred on it by contract. It enjoys a monopoly in that regard in Germany.

17 TL and OS are authors of literary works, who are members of, and have entered into management agreements with VG Wort. During the period at issue, namely from 1 January 2016 to 30 September 2019, they declared various works to VG Wort and received payments from the revenue received by that society.

18 Those agreements stipulate that the calculation and payment of the rightholders’ share of those revenues are governed by VG Wort’s articles of association and distribution plan.

19 VG Wort’s articles of association, in the versions applicable during the period at issue, also governed the funding distributions made to the Förderungsfonds Wissenschaft (science promotion fund; ‘FFW’), a fund belonging to a company of which VG Wort is the sole member.

20 In accordance with its articles of association, the object of FFW is to promote science and research, by funding printing costs in relation to the publication of scientific and specialist works, research leading to those works and other initiatives for the promotion of scientific and specialist literature. It is apparent from the information provided to the Court that the subsidy to FFW was financed by deductions from revenue collected, inter alia, as compensation for private copying and as remuneration for public lending of scientific, technical and specialist works.

21 TL disputes, on the basis of his own rights and the rights assigned to him by OS, VG Wort’s allocation to FFW of sums deriving from the revenue which that company received during the period at issue, thereby reducing the payments made to TL and OS in respect of copyright. At first instance, TL sought a declaration that VG Wort is not entitled, in order to fund FFW, to deduct sums from the revenue which should in that regard be paid to the rightholders. Furthermore, TL requested information on the amount of sums paid to FFW. The Landgericht (Regional Court) granted the application for a declaration and the application for disclosure in favour of OS, in full, but granted the application for disclosure in favour of TL only in part.

22 The appeal court upheld that decision in favour of OS. In that regard, that court held that VG Wort’s distribution plans, incorporated into the management agreements, constituted general terms and conditions in which the provisions relating to payments made to FFW are null and void under national law, on the ground that they are contrary to fundamental principles of the VGG and the legislation that preceded it, in so far as any persons would be receiving payments to which they were not entitled. By contrast, that court dismissed TL’s appeal in its entirety, on the ground that it had not been established that payments to him had been reduced.

23 The Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice, Germany), which is the referring court, considers that the outcome of the appeal before it depends on whether the provisions of the distribution plans relating to the payments to be made to FFW are in fact null and void in that they provide for payments to a person who is not entitled to them.

24 In that regard, the referring court states that even though the appeal court has, in accordance with national case-law, held that a collecting society must distribute the revenue from its activity exclusively among the rightholders, it cannot be excluded that the payments made to FFW comply with Paragraph 32(1) of the VGG, in accordance with which collecting societies are called upon to promote works and services of cultural importance. According to the referring court, that provision does not limit the group of recipients of that promotion to rightholders but also allows for the promotion of the future creation of works and the future provision of services. Consequently, it is possible that those payments to FFW should not be regarded as constituting an unlawful sharing with a non-entitled person. However, such a conclusion would depend on whether that provision complies with EU law.

25 According to the referring court, it follows from the principles established in the judgments of 9 February 2012, Luksan (C-277/10, EU:C:2012:65), and of 11 July 2013, Amazon.com International Sales and Others (C-521/11, EU:C:2013:515), that copyright holders who are entitled to the fair compensation due under the private copying exception provided for in Article 5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29 and to the remuneration due for public lending, under the first sentence of Article 6(1) of Directive 2006/115, must necessarily receive that revenue; however, there is nothing to prevent part of the income for fair compensation from being paid to them indirectly, through social and cultural establishments set up for their benefit. The referring court states that that rule is sometimes understood as not allowing persons other than copyright holders to be beneficiaries in so far as those rightholders have not agreed to that. It is necessary to determine whether, in the light of the subsequently adopted provisions of Directive 2014/26, it is nonetheless appropriate to allow the promotion of social, cultural or educational purposes benefiting recipients who are not, or in any event are not yet, members of the group of rightholders.

26 In that regard, the referring court considers that Article 8(5)(d), Article 11(4) and Article 12(4) of Directive 2014/26, read in the light of recitals 3 and 28 of that directive, appear to indicate that collective management organisations (‘CMOs’) – provided that a decision to that effect has been taken by the general assembly of their members – must be able to provide social, cultural or educational services, including for beneficiaries other than rightholders. Support given to creators who are not, or are not yet, rightholders could thus be regarded as lawful use ‘for purposes other than’ the distribution of rights revenue to rightholders, within the meaning of Article 11(4), provided that the decision taken by the general assembly of members so provides.

27 The referring court is also of the view that such an interpretation is not called into question by Article 13(6) of Directive 2014/26, which allows Member States to regulate the use of non-distributable amounts to fund social, cultural or educational activities for the benefit of rightholders, since that provision relates to non-distributable amounts, not to deductions.

28 That said, in the event that provision of the social, cultural or educational services referred to in Article 12(4) of Directive 2014/26 is permitted only to rightholders, within the meaning of Article 3(c) of that directive, it would be necessary to determine whether, under EU law, the lawfulness of the provision of those services depends on the recipient of those services having a present right to remuneration or whether it sufficient to hold a copyright or related right that is not currently remunerated. In addition, it would be necessary to clarify whether the lawfulness of those services is conditional upon the existence of a management agreement with the CMO. According to the referring court, a rightholder may have a present right to remuneration, or may in fact simply hold a copyright-protected right but no present right to remuneration. Furthermore, a distinction could be drawn depending upon whether or not the rightholder has entered into a management agreement with the CMO. It should be clarified whether those different situations affect the permissibility of providing the social, cultural or educational services referred to in Article 12(4) of Directive 2014/26.

29 In those circumstances, the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1) Is the fact that a provision of national law provides that a collecting society is to promote works of cultural importance and that, as consequence thereof, recipients who are not (or, in any event, not yet) part of the group of rightholders also benefit from that promotion compatible with Article 5(2)(b) of [Directive 2001/29], with the first sentence of Article 6(1) of Directive [2006/115], and with Article 11(4) and Article 12(4) of [Directive 2014/26]?

(2) In the event that the provision of social, cultural or educational services under Article 12(4) of [Directive 2014/26] is permitted only to rightholders: Does the permissibility of providing such services depend on the recipient of those services having a present right to remuneration, or is it sufficient to hold a present copyright or related right that is not currently remunerated? Is the permissibility of such services conditional upon the existence of a management agreement with the collecting society?’

Procedure before the Court

30 By document lodged at the Court Registry on 9 March 2026, TL requested the reopening of the oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 83 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice.

31 In support of that request, TL stated that the list of possible grounds for reopening the procedure set out in Article 83 is simply indicative, and submitted that the Advocate General based his Opinion, delivered on 26 February 2026, on arguments that were ‘unexpected and surprising’ in relation to the content and purpose of intellectual property law and to the rights and obligations of CMOs. According to TL, those arguments are incompatible with EU law and the case-law of the Court of Justice. TL states in that regard, in essence, that the Advocate General, in relying in his Opinion on a theory relating to the nature of the fundamental right to the protection of intellectual property, propounds an exaggerated view of the tasks and powers of CMOs. In support of his own interpretation of EU law, TL also refers to the arguments set out in his written observations.

32 In that regard, it should be noted that, under the second paragraph of Article 252 TFEU, it is the duty of the Advocate General, acting with complete impartiality and independence, to make, in open court, reasoned submissions on cases which, in accordance with the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, require his or her involvement. The Court is not bound either by the Advocate General’s Opinion or by the reasoning on which it is based (judgment of 29 January 2026, Keladis I and Keladis II, C-72/24 and C-73/24, EU:C:2026:51 paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).

33 It should also be noted, in that context, that the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the Rules of Procedure make no provision for the parties or the interested persons referred to in Article 23 of that statute to submit observations in response to the Advocate General’s Opinion. The fact that a party or such an interested person disagrees with the Advocate General’s Opinion, irrespective of the questions examined in the Opinion, cannot, therefore, in itself constitute grounds justifying the reopening of the oral procedure (judgment of 29 January 2026, Keladis I and Keladis II, C-72/24 and C-73/24, EU:C:2026:51, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited).

34 Thus, since TL’s request that the oral part of the procedure be reopened seeks to allow him to respond to the position taken by the Advocate General in his Opinion, that request cannot be granted.

35 Admittedly, pursuant to Article 83 of the Rules of Procedure, the Court may at any time, after hearing the Advocate General, decide to open the oral part of the procedure or order the reopening of that part, in particular if it considers that it lacks sufficient information or where a party has, after the close of that part of the procedure, submitted a new fact which is of such a nature as to be a decisive factor for the decision of the Court, or where the case must be decided on the basis of an argument which has not been debated between the parties or the interested persons referred to in Article 23 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

36 However, in the present case, TL’s observations submitted in his request referred to in paragraph 30 above do not reveal an argument which has not been debated between the parties or a new fact of such a nature as to be a decisive factor for the decision which the Court is called upon to give in the present case.

37 Since the Court has all the information necessary to answer the questions referred for a preliminary ruling by the referring court, it holds, after hearing the Advocate General, that, in those circumstances, there is no need to order the reopening of the oral part of the procedure.

Consideration of the questions referred

The first question

38 It should be recalled, as a preliminary point, that, according to settled case-law, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court should, where necessary, reformulate the questions referred to it. It is for the Court to extract from all the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the order for reference, the points of EU law which require interpretation, having regard to the subject matter of the dispute (judgment of 16 April 2026, Stichting de Thuiskopie, C-496/24, EU:C:2026:296, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited).

39 In its first question, the referring court seeks an interpretation of Article 5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29, the first sentence of Article 6(1) of Directive 2006/115 and Article 11(4) and Article 12(4) of Directive 2014/26.

40 While the first two provisions confer rights on copyright holders, namely a right to fair compensation for private copying and a right to remuneration for public lending, the latter two provisions concern the management by a CMO of the revenue from the exploitation of copyright. In particular, Article 11(4) of Directive 2014/26 concerns, more generally, the use of that revenue, whereas Article 12(4) of that directive concerns, in particular, the deductions made from that revenue in order to fund social, cultural or educational services provided by the CMO.

41 As is apparent from the order for reference, the dispute in the main proceedings concerns the payment, by the CMO in question in the main proceedings, of part of the revenue that it has collected on behalf of holders of copyright in literary works – revenue derived from the exploitation of those holders’ copyright – to a fund belonging to a company wholly owned by that CMO; that payment is in order to finance activities relating to the promotion of works and services of cultural importance, which the referring court considers to fall within the scope of social, cultural or educational services, within the meaning, in particular, of Article 12(4) of Directive 2014/26. In that context, the referring court is uncertain whether national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which allows a CMO to allocate part of the revenue from the exploitation of copyright to the funding of such services, is compatible with that directive, where those services benefit persons who are not, or are not yet, holders of such copyright.

42 It follows that the dispute in the main proceedings concerns only the management of revenue from the exploitation of copyright and, in particular, the use of that revenue and the deductions made from it in order to fund social, cultural or educational services.

43 Admittedly, it is apparent from the information provided by the referring court that the revenue concerned by the payment at issue in the main proceedings comes from that collected by way of compensation for private copying, referred to in Article 5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29, and from that collected by way of remuneration for public lending, provided for in the first sentence of Article 6(1) of Directive 2006/115. However, in the light of Directive 2014/26, that revenue forms part of the revenue from the exploitation of copyright, referred to in Article 3(h) of that directive.

44 Indeed, it should be noted that ‘rights revenue’ is defined in Article 3(h) of Directive 2014/26 as ‘income collected by a [CMO] on behalf of rightholders, whether deriving from an exclusive right, a right to remuneration or a right to compensation’.

45 Consequently, the interpretation of Article 5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29 and the first sentence of Article 6(1) of Directive 2006/115 is not relevant for the purposes of the dispute in the main proceedings.

46 In those circumstances, it must be held that, by its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 11(4) and Article 12(4) of Directive 2014/26 must be interpreted as precluding, on the basis of national legislation under which CMOs are called upon to promote works of cultural importance, the articles of association of a CMO from providing that part of the ‘rights revenue’, within the meaning of Article 3(h) of that directive, be allocated to the funding of social, cultural or educational services, where those services benefit persons who are not copyright holders.

47 Article 11(4) of Directive 2014/26 lays down the principle that a CMO may not use rights revenue for purposes other than distribution to rightholders. However, that provision refers to two exceptions to that principle. First, that revenue may be used for the deduction or offsetting of a CMO’s management fees, provided that such use is authorised pursuant to a decision taken in accordance with point (d) of Article 8(5) of that directive. Second, CMOs may use that revenue for purposes other than distribution to rightholders, provided that such use is authorised pursuant to a decision taken in accordance with Article 8(5) of that directive.

48 As regards, in particular, that second exception, which is the only one relevant in the present case in the light of the dispute in the main proceedings, it should be noted that, according to the latter provision, the general assembly of members of the CMO must decide in accordance with the provisions of Title II, Chapter 2 of Directive 2014/26, which concerns the management of rights revenue and consists in Articles 11 to 13 of that directive. It follows that the general assembly gives concrete expression, by its decisions adopted pursuant to Article 8(5), to the rules relating to the use of rights revenue, the deduction from that revenue and the distribution of the amounts due, laid down in Articles 11 to 13, within the limits determined by the latter.

49 As regards, in the first place, deductions from rights revenue, which are made directly from that revenue before the amounts due to rightholders are allocated, Article 12(1) of Directive 2014/26 requires Member States to ensure that, where a rightholder authorises a CMO to manage his or her rights, that body must provide him or her with information on management fees and other deductions from the rights revenue and from any income arising from the investment of rights revenue, before obtaining his or her consent to its managing his or her rights. It follows from that wording that deductions for purposes other than management fees, made from that revenue and income, are, in principle, permitted. Thus, Article 12(4) of that directive expressly refers to the funding, by means of deductions from that revenue, of social, cultural and educational services.

50 That said, as regards the determination of the recipients of services funded by deductions made from rights revenue, Article 12(4) of Directive 2014/26, read in conjunction with Article 12(2) and recital 28 of that directive, tends to suggest that those services should benefit only copyright holders.

51 First, Article 12(2) of Directive 2014/26 provides that deductions are to be reasonable in relation to the services provided by the CMO to rightholders, including, where appropriate, the services referred to in Article 12(4), and must be established on the basis of objective criteria. The wording of Article 12(2) therefore envisages only the case of services provided to those rightholders and includes in those services those referred to in Article 12(4).

52 Second, Article 12(4) of Directive 2014/26 provides that where a CMO provides social, cultural or educational services funded through deductions from rights revenue or from any income arising from the investment of rights revenue, such services must be provided on the basis of fair criteria, in particular as regards access to, and the extent of, those services. In that regard, recital 28 of Directive 2014/26, in the light of which Article 12 of that directive must be interpreted, expressly states that rightholders should have access, on a non-discriminatory basis, to any social, cultural or educational service. It follows that Article 12(4) of that directive limits the possibility for CMOs of making deductions for social, cultural or educational services, in that those services must exclusively benefit rightholders.

53 Such an interpretation is consistent with the Court’s case-law on compensation for private copying, provided for in Article 5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29, and on remuneration for public lending, referred to in Article 6(1) of Directive 2006/115, which form part of ‘rights revenue’, as is apparent from the very definition of that concept in Article 3(h) of Directive 2014/26 recalled in paragraph 44 above.

54 As regards, first, compensation for private copying, provided for in Article 5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29, in its judgment of 12 November 2015, Hewlett-Packard Belgium (C-572/13, EU:C:2015:750, paragraph 48), the Court held, in essence, that since that compensation is intended to compensate for the harm suffered by rightholders as a result of the reproduction of their works without their authorisation, persons who are not rightholders and do not, therefore, suffer any harm as a result of such reproduction cannot receive such compensation when such receipt would have the result of depriving those rightholders of all or part of that compensation. On the other hand, in its judgment of 11 July 2013, Amazon.com International Sales and Others (C-521/11, EU:C:2013:515, paragraphs 49 to 54), the Court did, admittedly, hold that Directive 2001/29 does not require those entitled to compensation for private copying to be paid all that compensation in cash and does not preclude Member States from providing that part of that compensation be paid indirectly to those entitled, through the intermediary of social and cultural establishments set up for their benefit. However, the Court pointed out that, first, the actual allocation of part of the income intended for that compensation to those establishments is compatible with the objective of that compensation only if those establishments actually benefit the persons entitled. Second, even if part of the compensation for private copying may be paid indirectly to those persons, it must in its entirety benefit the rightholders. Indeed, the Court held that it would not be consistent with the objective of the compensation in question for those establishments to grant the benefit thereof to persons other than those entitled.

55 As regards, second, the remuneration for public lending referred to in Article 6(1) of Directive 2006/115, the Court has held that, although in Directive 2006/115 the EU legislature used the term ‘remuneration’ instead of the term ‘compensation’ employed in Directive 2001/29, the concept of ‘remuneration’ is also designed to establish recompense for authors, since it arises in order to compensate for harm to the latter (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 February 2012, Luksan, C-277/10, EU:C:2012:65, paragraph 103). Consequently, in so far as that remuneration is to be regarded as constituting compensation for that harm, it must, in accordance with the principles set out in the case-law cited in the preceding paragraph of this judgment, accrue in full, directly or indirectly, to those entitled to it.

56 The case-law cited in paragraphs 54 and 55 above thus supports the interpretation set out in paragraph 52 above. Indeed, an interpretation allowing a deduction to be made from rights revenue in order to fund services benefiting persons who are not rightholders would have the effect of depriving those holders of part of that revenue. That conclusion applies, moreover, irrespective of the contractual or statutory basis of that revenue.

57 In that context, it should be borne in mind that Directive 2014/26 did not seek to depart from the principles established in earlier directives adopted in the field of copyright and related rights, such as Directives 2001/29 and 2006/115. Indeed, Directive 2014/26 does not contain provisions replacing or repealing those of the latter directives. On the contrary, recital 1 of Directive 2014/26 refers to them. Furthermore, as is apparent from Article 1 and recitals 6 to 9 of Directive 2014/26, that directive seeks to ensure the proper functioning of the collective management of copyright, which includes, as is apparent from Article 3(h) of that directive, the management of revenue collected, inter alia, by way of compensation for private copying provided for in Article 5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29, and remuneration for public lending, referred to in Article 6(1) of Directive 2006/115. Accordingly, the fact that Directive 2014/26 was adopted after the delivery of the judgments cited in paragraphs 54 and 55 above has no bearing on the interpretation of that directive and in no way affects the relevance of those judgments to that interpretation.

58 Consequently, it follows from the foregoing that the deductions made by the CMO from rights revenue, under Article 12 of Directive 2014/26, and, therefore, before that revenue is allocated and distributed to rightholders, can be made in order to fund the social, cultural or educational services referred to in Article 12(4) only if those services benefit, as the case may be indirectly, those rightholders exclusively.

59 As regards, in the second place, the use of rights revenue in the context of the distribution of the amounts due, that distribution must, in principle, in accordance with Article 11(4) of that directive, be made to rightholders. However, as has been noted in paragraph 47 above, Article 11(4) allows CMOs to use rights revenue for purposes other than their distribution to rightholders, provided that such use is authorised pursuant to a decision taken in accordance with Article 8(5) of that directive. In that regard, in accordance with Article 8(5)(b) and (e) of that directive, the general assembly of members of the CMO is to decide on the general policy on the use of non-distributable amounts and on the use of those amounts.

60 In accordance with Article 13(4) of Directive 2014/26, the amounts due to rightholders which cannot be distributed after three years from the end of the financial year in which the collection of the rights revenue occurred, even though the CMO has taken all necessary measures to identify and locate the rightholders referred to in Article 13(3) of that directive, are to be deemed non-distributable. It must be borne in mind, in that context, that since those amounts derive from rights revenue within the meaning of Article 3(h) of Directive 2014/26, they may include, inter alia, both revenue from the compensation for private copying, provided for in Article 5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29, and from remuneration for public lending, referred to in Article 6(1) of Directive 2006/115.

61 Thus, where it is not possible to distribute the rights revenue to the rightholders concerned because they could not be identified and located, the general assembly of members is permitted, under Article 11(4), read in conjunction with Article 8(5)(b) and (e), of Directive 2014/26, to decide on the general policy of use and to determine the use of that revenue.

62 As it is, that use may relate to social, cultural and educational services benefiting, as the case may be, persons other than the rightholders.

63 Indeed, according to Article 13(6) of that directive, Member States may limit or determine the permitted uses of non-distributable amounts, by ensuring that such amounts are used in a separate and independent way in order to fund social, cultural and educational activities for the benefit of rightholders. It follows that Directive 2014/26 empowers, in principle and in the absence of intervention to the contrary by the Member State concerned, the general assembly of members of a CMO to authorise the use of rights revenue that could not be distributed to rightholders, within the meaning of Article 13(4) of that directive, in order to fund social, cultural and educational services for the benefit of persons other than the rightholders.

64 Consequently, in the absence of such intervention by the Member State concerned, a CMO would be permitted, pursuant to Article 11(4) of that directive, read in conjunction with Article 8(5)(b) and (e) and Article 13(6) thereof, to use the aforementioned revenue to fund those services for the benefit of persons who are not, or are not yet, rightholders, provided that the general assembly of members has so decided.

65 Moreover, in such a situation, it could not be considered that rightholders are deprived of the amounts due to them, since it is, by definition, impossible to identify those rightholders and, therefore, to allocate amounts to them.

66 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first question is that Article 11(4), read in conjunction with Article 12(4) and Article 13(4) and (6) of Directive 2014/26, must be interpreted, first, as precluding – on the basis of national legislation under which CMOs are called upon to promote works of cultural importance – the articles of association of a CMO from providing that part of the ‘rights revenue’, within the meaning of Article 3(h) of that directive, be allocated to the funding of social, cultural or educational services which benefit persons who are not copyright holders, where that funding is provided by means of deductions made from that revenue and, second, as not precluding those articles of association where that funding is provided by means of ‘non-distributable amounts’, within the meaning of Article 13(4) of that directive.

The second question

67 By its second question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether, as regards social, cultural and educational services provided by a CMO and funded through deductions from ‘rights revenue’ within the meaning of Article 3(h) of Directive 2014/26, Article 12(4) of that directive must be interpreted as meaning that those services can benefit only rightholders who have a present right to remuneration or who have concluded a management agreement with that CMO.

68 As is apparent from paragraphs 47 to 52 above, under Article 11(4) and Article 12(4) of Directive 2014/26, CMOs may fund social, cultural or educational services by means of deductions made from that revenue, provided that that use of revenue is authorised pursuant to a decision taken in accordance with Article 8(5) of that directive and that those services benefit rightholders exclusively.

69 As regards, in the first place, whether a rightholder must establish the existence of a present right to remuneration, in the sense that he or she has the right to participate in the distribution of rights revenue during the period to which the decision of the general assembly taken pursuant to Article 8(5) of that directive relates, in order to be able to benefit from those services, it should be noted that the concept of ‘rightholder’, for the purposes of applying Directive 2014/26, is defined in Article 3(c) of that directive as any person or entity, other than a CMO, that holds a copyright or related right or, under an agreement for the exploitation of rights or by law, is entitled to a share of the rights revenue.

70 It follows from that definition that, in order to be able to benefit from social, cultural and educational services provided by a CMO and funded by deductions from rights revenue, it is sufficient for such a person or entity to fall within the scope of the concept of ‘rightholder’, without any additional conditions being required, such as the existence of a ‘present’ right to remuneration.

71 In that context, it should be noted that, in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 13(1) of that directive, the amounts due to rightholders must be distributed and paid by the CMOs as soon as possible and, in principle, no later than nine months from the end of the financial year in which the rights revenue was collected. By contrast, Directive 2014/26 does not contain any provision relating to the period during which the services referred to in Article 12(4) thereof must be provided.

72 Accordingly, to make the benefit of those services conditional upon the possibility of relying on a present right to remuneration would have the effect of establishing a link which the EU legislature did not seek to create between the period during which such services may be provided to a rightholder and the period relating to the receipt, by that rightholder, of the revenue from his or her rights.

73 It follows that a rightholder, as defined in Article 3(c) of Directive 2014/26, does not have to establish that he or she has a ‘present’ right to remuneration under copyright, in order to be able to benefit from the social, cultural and educational services provided by a CMO and funded by deductions from ‘rights revenue’, within the meaning of Article 3(h) of that directive.

74 As regards, in the second place, whether a management agreement with the CMO providing those services is required in order for a rightholder to be able to benefit from them, the Court points out that Article 12(2) and (4) of Directive 2014/26 refers to social, cultural or educational services provided by a CMO to rightholders, and does not contain any further details as regards the latter. However, it should be noted that that is also the case with other provisions of that directive, in particular Article 11(4) thereof, which provides that CMOs are not to be permitted to use rights revenue for purposes other than distribution to rightholders.

75 It follows that, for the purposes of applying Directive 2014/26 and, in particular, as regards the services referred to in Article 12(2) and (4) thereof and funded by deductions from rights revenue, rightholders are to be understood as those whose rights management falls within the scope of the activity of the CMO concerned. As the Advocate General observed, in essence, in point 73 of his Opinion, given that the fields of activity of CMOs are defined according to the type of protected subject matter or the categories of rights, as provided for in Article 5(2) of Directive 2014/26, such social, cultural or educational services provided by those bodies can benefit only rightholders whose rights management falls within the scope of the activity of the CMO concerned. Otherwise, those entitled to the aforementioned revenue would be deprived of the amounts accruing to them in respect of the exploitation of their rights.

76 In that context relating to the nature of the link between rightholders and CMOs, it should also be noted, as the Advocate General observed in essence in point 71 of his Opinion, that, since the compensation for private copying, provided for in Article 5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29, and the remuneration for public lending, referred to in Article 6(1) of Directive 2006/115, are due under national law, where the Member State concerned has made use of the option available to it under those provisions, the management of such rights by a CMO may, in principle, take place without the need for a contractual relationship between that body and the holder of those rights.

77 That interpretation is borne out by recital 26 of Directive 2014/26. That recital states that the revenue is ultimately due to rightholders, who may have a direct legal relationship with the CMO, or may be represented via an entity which is a member of the CMO or via a representation agreement. It follows that a direct contractual relationship, such as an agreement for the management of its rights in respect of one or more specific works, between the rightholder and the CMO concerned, is not required.

78 It follows from the foregoing that the lawfulness, in the light of Directive 2014/26, of the provision of social, cultural and educational services to ‘rightholders’, within the meaning of Article 3(c) of that directive, funded by deductions pursuant to Article 12(4) of that directive, does not depend on whether those rightholders have a present right to remuneration or on the conclusion of a management agreement with the CMO.

79 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the second question is that, as regards social, cultural and educational services provided by a CMO and funded by deductions from ‘rights revenue’ within the meaning of Article 3(h) of Directive 2014/26, Article 12(4) of that directive must be interpreted as meaning that those services may benefit ‘rightholders’ within the meaning of Article 3(c) of that directive, irrespective of whether or not those rightholders have a present right to remuneration or whether or not they have concluded a management agreement with that CMO, provided that, directly or indirectly, the management of the rights on behalf of those holders falls within the scope of the activity of the CMO concerned.

Costs

80 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

On those grounds, the Court (Fifth Chamber) hereby rules:

1. Article 11(4), read in conjunction with Article 12(4) and Article 13(4) and (6), of Directive 2014/26/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online use in the internal market,

must be interpreted, first, as precluding – on the basis of national legislation under which collective management organisations are called upon to promote works of cultural importance – the articles of association of a collective management organisation from providing that part of the ‘rights revenue’, within the meaning of Article 3(h) of that directive, be allocated to the funding of social, cultural or educational services which benefit persons who are not copyright holders, where that funding is provided by means of deductions made from that revenue and, second, as not precluding those articles of association where that funding is provided by means of ‘non-distributable amounts’, within the meaning of Article 13(4) of that directive.

2. Article 12(4) of Directive 2014/26

must be interpreted as meaning that, as regards social, cultural and educational services provided by a collective management organisation and funded by deductions from ‘rights revenue’, within the meaning of Article 3(h) of that directive, those services may benefit ‘rightholders’ within the meaning of Article 3(c) of that directive, irrespective of whether or not those rightholders have a present right to remuneration or whether or not they have concluded a management agreement with that collective management organisation, provided that, directly or indirectly, the management of the rights on behalf of those holders falls within the scope of the activity of the collective management organisation concerned.

[Signatures]

* Language of the case: German.

CJEU, 22 Oct 2026, C-840/24 (VG Wort)